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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Preface 
The significance of software has increased in today’s digital society. More and more of 
the everyday functions are in a digital form. Payments are done via internet banking, 
cash registers are actually PC’s which function with computer programs, most of the 
office work is done with computers and internet phones, authorities’ registers are in an 
electronic form and we interact with our friends in the social media. Further, the core 
infrastructure of our society (heat and electricity production and distribution, traffic 
lights, alarm systems, communications networks, hospital systems, industrial plant 
automation systems et cetera) are either completely dependent on, or at least managed, 
in some degree, by a specialized software. This is a proof of how we depend on 
computer programs. The challenges caused by the incredible speed of digitalization 
have aroused many problems, and collusion or overlap of the different fields of laws has 
occurred because the applicable legislation and legal theory behind it struggle to keep 
pace with the speed of technological development.        
1.1.1  The idea behind the software business 
The software business is huge nowadays and a lot of money is involved. Software also 
plays an important role in the consumers’ everyday lives. The software companies 
invest a lot of money and time in order to develop and bring new software products to 
the market. In addition to the commercial software products, the services around them 
(for example the maintenance and support of software) have become more and more 
important. The services are created in order to support the product itself and to enhance 
the value the customer gains from the software. Again a lot of money and time has been 
spent to ensure that services correspond to the customers’ demand. For this reason it is 
very important for a software company that it can rely on its ability to price and 
leverage the additional value that they bring to their end customers in order to gain more 
revenue. Today, exclusive right given to a software company’s product under copyright 
law is the primary legal tool for ensuring that goal. Without a mechanism such as the 
exclusive copyright, the software companies would not have an incentive to innovate 
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new products, to improve their existing products and at last to create supporting services 
for the products. At the end, all this creative work ends up improving consumer welfare. 
The computer programs are copyright protected which ensures the software business. 
The essential part of that protection is an exclusive right to impose and exploit the 
product, that is, to decide who can use the product and for which price and terms, if any. 
Therefore, the other market players are forced to create products on their own in order 
to compete of the marketplace. From this perspective, the incentive to create new 
products can be seen coming from the nature of copyright. 
The software companies usually exploit their software by license agreements. In this 
way their innovations benefit the companies financially. Based on the freedom of 
contract, the companies may choose with whom they conclude the contracts and what 
are the terms they set as the licensing conditions. As Pekka Takki has quipped, a 
copyright owner of a software product could say “I got it, I sell it, I still got it.”1 This 
could be said to be the idea behind the commercial software product business.
2
 
1.1.2 Competition law takes away what intellectual property laws are providing –  
or does it? 
The software companies compete on software market by developing new and better 
products than their competitors in order to gain market share and become a market 
leader or maintain their position as market leaders. This competition is regulated under 
competition law in order to ensure effective and undistorted competition within the 
market. Both intellectual property laws and competition law have the same aim – 
incentive to new innovations. In a well-working marketplace, each system, competition 
law and copyright would contribute to the consumer welfare by bringing new, improved 
innovations and products to a constantly competed marketplace. One wants to be better 
                                                     
1
 Takki 2002, 47. 
2
 The same logic does not necessarily apply to the so called “be-spoke system deliveries” where the 
software supplier creates a software product for the use of a single customer, or to a very limited customer 
base. In these cases, the software supplier is not necessarily able to leverage the intellectual property 
associated with the system even if it manages to retain the rights to the system, as the system itself may be 
of limited use to the other customers (in other words, there is no wider demand for the product than the 
single sale). 
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and have more market share than its competitors by products that are satisfying to 
consumers’ demand.  
The competition within the European Union is based on the active market in its Member 
States territory. More precisely, it is based on the four freedoms set down in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU), however, keeping 
consumers’ interests in mind. For this reason, there is a need to regulate and limit 
certain competitive behaviors.
3
 The abuse of dominant position is prohibited in the 
Article 102 (TFEU) but a dominant market position itself is not denied therein.
4
 The 
goal of this prohibition is to try to protect the market from harmful effects where such 
harmful effects overweigh the benefits of unrestricted competitive behavior between the 
companies involved. 
It has been stated that an exclusive right of the right holder under intellectual property 
rights in its own way restricts competition from an economic perspective. However, 
without incentive to innovations the product would perhaps never be created. Further, 
without some form of protection there would not be incentive effect to create new 
innovations.
5
 The exclusive right prevents the so called free riders of intellectual 
property and forces the competitors to develop new and independent items.
6
  
The question of compulsory licensing has been raised, which basically means that the 
company is obligated to license its software to its competitors with non-discriminatory 
terms and reasonable price. There have been some situations where a company, as an 
owner of intellectual property, has been obliged to license its intellectual property to its 
competitors. Though this has been in a situation where the company has held a 
dominant market position on upstream market and it has prevented, by using this 
position, efficient competition on downstream market. Moreover, it has been considered 
that there is a failure of competition on the relevant market. The failure has aroused 
                                                     
3
 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Official Journal C 83 of 30.3.2010. 
4
 In this thesis will be used Article 102 to cover also previous Treaties corresponding Articles (82 and 86) 
Although many of the cases has been processed under previous Treaties this has been considered to be 
most coherent manner of presentation.  
5
 T. Mylly, Tekijänoikeuden ideologiat ja myytit 2/2004, 229. Original reference Gordon, Wendy: 
Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 University of Dayton 
Law Review (1992), 854. 
6
 T. Mylly, Tekijänoikeuden ideologiat ja myytit 2/2004, 229. Original reference Lehmann (1985), 538. 
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when a company holding a dominant position is not willing to license its product to its 
competitors. However, the precondition has been that the product has been so essential 
for the competitors that refusing an access to it has prevented the competition on the 
particular market.  
The duty to license can be seen as a collision between the intellectual property rights 
and competition law and has received a lot of attention among legal debate. It is also a 
difficult subject as both of these legal concepts have the same goal but different means. 
First of all, the duty to license intervenes to the right holder’s exclusive right to impose 
and exploit its own intellectual property and its freedom of contract. At the end, it is the 
nature of business to try to have a better product than the competitors or a product 
which the competitors do not have at all in order to benefit from the product by gaining 
a high profit margin and/or high revenues through gaining a large market share.
7
 
The interface of competition law and intellectual property laws is not simple. It is very 
difficult to draw general resolution models from intellectual property and competition 
law cases because of the nature of intellectual property rights and because the decisions 
of the Courts of European Union are characterized by ad hoc consideration.
8
 However, 
this thesis tries to find the coherent points from decisions made in EU’s case law. It can 
be asked whether the competition law takes away what intellectual property laws are 
providing.
9
 
1.2 The research goals and scope of the thesis  
This chapter outlines the goals and the scope of the thesis. The central research goal of 
the thesis is to study the legal framework which governs compulsory licensing of 
software in a dominant market position. The subject of the thesis combines two 
different fields of law. The scope of the thesis is limited to the problem whether a 
company in the dominant market position has obligation to license its software, and if 
so, on which grounds the obligation may materialize. However, this thesis will not 
research on what terms the license must be given and who decides the terms. 
                                                     
7
 The writer of this thesis has experience in software business and therefore has perhaps business-oriented 
approach in this matter. 
8
 Alkio, M. ja Wik, C. 2004, 372. 
9
 L. Peeperkorn 2003, 527 - 528. 
5 
 
The thesis studies the copyright protection of software, but only briefly goes through the 
other forms of protection, that is, the thesis does not research deeply other protection 
forms of software. The competition law part studies the abuse of a dominant market 
position under the Article 102 (TFEU) by concentrating to the refusal to supply. The 
dominant market position and its definition will be reviewed briefly, but the deeper 
survey is left outside of the scope of this thesis. Defining a dominant position in itself is 
a complex and case-by-case evaluation and gives a reason to leave it for another thesis 
to be researched. 
The thesis reviews the subject under European Union law. Firstly, the software business 
is very international and is not usually limited to only inside one state area. Secondly, 
the competition legislation is harmonized in EU and the trade between the Member 
States is regulated by EU competition law. Thirdly, there exists case law on EU level 
where the subject of this thesis has been discussed. And fourthly, even though the 
copyrights are regulated under national laws they are still very similar in each member 
country, especially regarding software where the copyright provisions have been 
harmonized with a directive.
10
 As a consequence, the review of Finnish legal framework 
around the subject is mainly excluded by the author’s conscious decision. The thesis 
aims to point out the substantial problems and rules under the subject without limiting 
its findings to the Finnish legislation. 
The subject of this thesis has been because there is clear collision between the 
competition law and the copyright of software which can be seen problematic also from 
the software business side. In software business, the copyright is very essential and, 
basically, the core of business. For this reason, this thesis tries to have a pragmatic 
approach to the issue viewed from the point of view of the software business.  
 
                                                     
10
 Council Directive of 14 th May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs 91/250/EEC. 
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1.3  Methodology, source material and structure 
This chapter outlines the methodology selected for the thesis and offers some arguments 
for the chosen approach. The structure of the thesis and the source material used in the 
research are also briefly introduced under this chapter. 
This thesis will study the prevailing EU legal rules of copyright as well as the abuse of 
dominant market position. It will survey the current legal situation around the subject. 
The case law has an important role on EU level and therefore the case law around the 
subject will be studied. Based on the nature of the subject, some law and economics 
argumentation will be included to the thesis. 
Chapter two goes first through the principles of copyright in general level, and further 
discusses the special features of software copyright protection. In this chapter, it will be 
discussed how the software protection has been developed and what is actually 
protected in software. In this connection the other forms and features of software 
protection are briefly reviewed. In chapter three the thesis will scrutiny the abuse of 
dominant market position under the Article 102 (TFEU). The substantial parts of the 
Article 102 are the concept of dominant market position as well as the concept of abuse. 
The thesis surveys the intellectual property rights and the abuse of dominant position in 
some extent to help the reader to understand the factors behind the duty to license. 
Chapter four combines these two different parts together. In this chapter, the collusion 
of intellectual property rights and competition law will be discussed. The refusal of 
supply is one form of abuse of dominant position and the thesis concentrates to review 
this form of abuse. The essential facility doctrine is developed under case law 
concerning the refusal to supply in a dominant position, and this doctrine will be 
discussed to the large extent in chapter four. Under the same chapter, the important 
European case law around the subject will be presented. The European Union case law 
is stressed in this thesis as the duty to deal has been developed in case law. 
The legal source material used in this thesis reflects the definition of the scope of this 
thesis. Therefore the majority of source material concentrates on EU regulation and 
relevant case law as well as to the legal literature around the subject.  
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1.4  Law and economics of intellectual property rights and competition law 
One of the goals of intellectual property rights is to reward the creator of work 
financially. The economic reward acts as an incentive for new innovations and works.
11
 
At the end, the consumers benefit from this incentive effect because new and better 
products will be developed and offered in the market as long as the protection of 
invention does not substantially prevent or hinder the appearance of other competing 
inventions. If intellectual property rights did not act as an incentive, or if they were 
over-protective, there would be none or just few new innovations available in the 
market for the consumers. Therefore, it is important that the intellectual property 
protection is adequately measured; it should not be stronger or weaker than is necessary 
for incentive effect and to ensure adequate economic reward for its creator.
12
 In an 
economic sense, protecting the creator is not an end in itself.
13
  
With economic argumentation it is possible to argument for limiting the intellectual 
property protection. One such argument could be that if the only aim of the protection 
were to protect the creator, the period of protection would not be temporally limited.
14
 
The protection cannot be too strong either. In that case, it would increase the costs of 
creating new products and be economically inefficient. This is one of the reasons why 
the idea under copyright can be later exploited in order to limit too strong exclusive 
right of the creator.
15
  
In the United States the economic argumentation has more importance, especially in 
intellectual property cases concerning computer programs.
16
 Also in Europe the 
economic incentive to innovation argumentation is part of the intellectual property 
rights discussion.
17
 However, in Europe the economic perspective has lesser meaning 
because traditionally in Europe the intellectual property rights stress the moral rights of 
the creator.
18
 On the other hand, in connection with the software the moral rights do not 
                                                     
11
 Haarman 2005, 10. 
12
 U.-M. Mylly 2006, 4. 
13
 The moral rights of the author can be seen to serve this purpose, but as they are not problematic from 
an economical or completion law point of view they are not a focus point in this thesis. 
14
 U.-M. Mylly 2006, 5. 
15
 U.-M. Mylly 2006, 5. 
16
 U.-M. Mylly 2006, 5. 
17
 Haarman 2005, 10. 
18
 Samuelson 2005, 4. 
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receive as much importance as in connection to the more traditional works. The 
software is meant for practical use.
19
 For this reason the economic matters related to the 
computer programs might weight more.
20
 
The economic argumentation is used widely as an argument in the competition law 
cases but, on the other hand, not in cases regarding intellectual property rights.
21
 
Software companies spend remarkable amounts of money in developing new software 
and want to leverage their exclusive rights and get compensation from its use. After all, 
it is the idea of the business of commercial software products.  
 
2 COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE 
2.1 Copyrights in general 
In the history of development of copyright, one of the most important aims has been to 
encourage literature and art. This aim has always been common for all nations’ 
copyright thinking.
22
 This is still important goal of the copyright laws; nowadays the 
copyright has perhaps more significant role in the commercial business than in the 
encouragement of arts. Therefore this chapter will present the economic goal of 
copyright.  
The object of copyright is the work itself. The work is a product of the spirit created by 
a human, and it represents individual creative contribution. Traditionally the copyright 
protection has covered for example books, paintings, compositions and other creative 
works. The copyright belongs to the person who has created a literary or artistic work. 
Nowadays, also the computer programs are included to these literary works.
23
 Copyright 
gives an exclusive protection to its creator to exploit its work. One of the main rights of 
the right holder is the right to deny the use of its intellectual property from third parties.  
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The copyrights are regulated under national laws, though there are also some EU level 
regulations as well as multinational copyright agreements.
24
 Even when the copyrights 
are very similar, there might be differences between the copyright laws of the Member 
States. The common law countries focus more on commercial protection whereas in 
civil law countries the stress is in the right of the creator of a work to be recognized as 
such as well as in moral rights.
25
 The copyright consists of both economic and moral 
rights.
26
 The economic rights give to its creator an exclusive right to dominate how the 
intellectual property is used. The Finnish Copyright Act Article 2 includes right holders’ 
economic rights. The copyright provides “the exclusive right to control a work by 
reproducing it and by making it available to the public".  
2.2 Software protection 
Computer programs have traditionally been protected by license agreements and still 
are, but in addition to that, computer programs are nowadays protected by copyright. 
License agreements have usually been used to give more protection to the software. 
Copyright laws and the Council Directive of 14 th May 1991 on the legal protection of 
computer programs 91/250/EEC regulates the minimum level of protection.
 27
 Further, 
the laws include mandatory provisions which contracting parties have to comply with.  
Under the Software Copyright Directive Article 2 Section 1, “the author of the 
computer program is the natural or legal person or group of natural persons who 
created it. Where collective works are recognized by the legislation of a Member State, 
the person considered by the legislation of that Member State to have created the work 
is deemed to be its author.” If the computer program is created under employment 
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relationship the employer alone is entitled to exercise all economic rights in the 
computer program.
28
 
According to the Software Copyright Directive Article 4, the author of the computer 
program has exclusive rights which include the right to perform or to authorize the 
reproduction of a computer program; the translation, adaptation, arrangement and other 
alteration of a computer program, as well as the distribution, including the rental, of a 
computer program or its copies. 
The Software Copyright Directive also includes third parties’ rights to the computer 
program. The person who has legally acquired the computer program is allowed to 
make a back-up copy insofar as it is necessary for that use. The person is also entitled to 
observe study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and 
principles which underlie any element of the program if he does so while performing 
any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program 
which he is entitled to perform. It also includes the exception which allows the 
decompilation of a computer program under certain limited conditions and with the aim 
of achieving the interoperability of an independently created computer program.
29
 
In the preparatory work of Finnish Copyright Act, the application of copyright to 
software by its flexibility is justified because it does not monopolize ideas. At the same 
time, when the copyright protects creative work, it promotes competition because the 
ideas and systems are available for everyone. If the ideas and principles were  protected 
and that way monopolized, it would impede software industry’s functionality and retard 
development.
30
   
Copyright protection makes software into a product. Without this protection it would 
not be worth to invest a lot of money and time to create software which is fast and 
cheap to copy and which is, though, value of money for the users. The protection differs 
from the more traditional forms of copyright protection. 
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2.2.1 Development of software copyright protection 
The computer programs have nowadays a more important position within the 
technology development. The development has been fast. The computer programs are 
protected by copyright. This was not a self-evident form of protection in the beginning. 
In early stage the computer programs were protected through license agreements. When 
computers became easily available to the consumers, the protection needed to be 
arranged by other means.
31
 It was then discussed how the software should be protected 
and it was debated whether the software should be protected by copyright, patent or 
something between those means.  
In 1978 the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) published a model law 
for computer programs which was based on copyright laws, but added there some 
elements which did not belong to copyright. After that WIPO prepared an international 
agreement which was supposed to be based on special provisions of the protection of 
computer programs. It was dismissed in 1983 due to lack of support. The United States 
decided to do necessary revisions to its own copyright Act in 1980 and was the first 
country where computer programs were protected by a copyright Act. It was the 
forerunner with the issue as in 1980s, different European countries began to add 
provisions concerning computer programs to their copyright acts as well. The copyright 
protection was generally accepted as problem-free and as the most popular alternative.
32
 
The Commission made a proposal of the Software Copyright Directive and it was 
accepted in 1991. The motives behind the Directive were to harmonize Member States 
legislations regarding computer programs and, especially, the economic interests’ of 
software industry and the protection of investments.
33
 In Finland the software copyright 
provisions were not taken into Finnish Copyright Act until 1991 and it was amended in 
1992 after the Software Copyright Directive came into force.
34
 The copyright protection 
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was considered to be adequate for software. Copyright is flexible because it protects 
expression but leaves ideas outside the protection. This was considered to secure the 
competition as well as the protection of original creators at the same time.
35
 
2.2.2 Special features of software and software as a work  
Copyright gives long protection to computer programs although the computer programs 
often become obsolete in commercial sense in relatively short time spans, sometimes 
even just after few weeks or a few years of the issuance.
36
 Besides temporal protection, 
the material protection of copyright is limited. The limitations of copyright are much 
more important for business than the temporal protection. Copyright applies to certain 
usage of software listed in the Software Copyright Directive such as copying, 
distributing and modification of software.  
Copyright protection requires from software that it exceeds a concept of a work. The 
concept of the work is not set high.
37
 According to the Software Copyright Directive, it 
is required from the program that it is creators own intellectual creation.
38
  
Software receives protection under the copyright laws although the software is more 
often licensed by agreements than sold. However, the license agreements may, and 
usually do, give more exhaustive protection for right holder than copyright laws do. By 
licensing the creator can control copying of the software in order to obtain the revenue 
from it. This always means that the usage is restricted to certain limits in the license 
agreement, that is, the more the licensee gets rights under the license agreement the 
more the licensor gains money from it. Software business is fast developing due to the 
reason that the developers try to gain return of investments to their development in a 
short term.   
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2.2.3 What is protected in software? 
What is then protected in software? The protection of software differs somewhat from 
other works protected by copyright. According to the established legal practice, the 
source code, reversed computer language and intermediate form of these two are 
protected by copyright in software.
39
  
The copyright does not apply to the whole computer program. It only gives protection to 
the visible parts of software, such as source, object code and graphic of user interface.  
According to the Software Copyright Directive, only the expression in any form of a 
computer program is protected. The ideas and principles which underlie any element of 
a program, such as logic, algorithms and programming languages, are not protected by 
copyright.
40
  Also some other solutions are not protected such as solutions which are 
possible to execute only one way.
41
  
The difference between protected expression and unprotected idea is not so clear. 
According to the Software Copyright Directive, for example the algorithms can be an 
unprotected idea in which case that part of source code is unprotected in software.
42
 It is 
always case-by-case consideration whether there is a question of idea or expression.
43
  
However, the visible parts of software, such as source, object code and graphic of user 
interface are protected. Otherwise it would be very easy for the competitors to copy the 
software and to sell it with a lower price than the original software without making huge 
investments.  
2.3 Other protection forms of software 
There are also other forms than copyright available for the protection of software. These 
will be briefly discussed under this chapter. The interoperability, network-effect and 
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lock-in will be discussed under this Chapter as well. These are not forms of protection, 
but are affected and related to software copyrights.  
2.3.1 Patents 
There has been discussion that copyright has some lacks as a protection form of 
computer programs. Quite soon after revision of legislation of copyright, there became a 
need to protect the computer programs by patents which became one form of protection.  
The United States started to grant patents for computer programs in mid-1980s because 
it was not possible to protect operating features of software by copyright.
44
 Nowadays, 
the patent protection is widely available also for software.
45
 In 2005, there was also a 
directive proposal in European Parliament regarding patenting of computer programs. 
However, this proposal was not accepted.
46
  
The patent’s protection is stronger than copyright protection. The protection is wider 
than only protection of source code, because it protects the particular methods of 
receiving the results but not the result itself.
47
 Patent gives more wide exclusive right to 
the right holder because it protects also the idea. This means that the third parties cannot 
as easily create software to the same purpose of use.
48
  
2.3.2 Technical protection 
The one form of protection is technical protection. Technical protection in its simplicity 
means the technical protection of software, so that the users cannot see the copyright 
protected parts of the software. Further, the users cannot see parts which do not receive 
protection under the copyright law because the technical protection prevents from 
seeing those; the user is unable to break the technical protection, regardless the law that 
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allows taking few copies from copyright protected work for own use. The technical 
protection makes it difficult to circumvent the protection and it is illegal to distribute 
tools which can circumvent the protection. The technical protection means that the 
software is protected two times, that is, software is protected by copyright law and the 
norms prohibiting distribution of the tools which circumvents the technical protection.
49
  
Technical protection gives perhaps greater protection than it is necessary. This would be 
in interest of many of the software suppliers in business manner, but perhaps technical 
protection does not fit together with the purpose of copyright laws. It could be asked 
though whether the copyright is, or is not, the right form of protection. 
2.3.3 Interfaces and interoperability 
Interoperability is a big issue in the field of computer technology business. Without 
interoperability, the computer programs would not function together. For this reason the 
decompilation is allowed in order to achieve interoperability between different 
computer programs.  
However, decompilation was a debated issue under the Software Copyright Directive. 
The market leaders wanted to prevent competitors’ possibilities to compete with them in 
the software market. Therefore the major US software companies wanted interface 
information under copyright.
50
 On the other hand, mainly European software companies 
wanted to allow decompilation widely.
51
  The Software Copyright Directive ended up 
admitting decompilation as a mandatory provision.
52
 From the starting point, the 
decompilation is meant to be used for interoperability between both hardware and 
software.
53
 
The aim of the decompilation is to promote competition.
54
 The Article 6 of the Software 
Copyright Directive concerns decompile of licensed software when it is necessary to 
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achieve interoperability between the programs, that is, the licensee can legally run the 
software to a form which approximates the source code.
55
 Without the Article 6 the 
decompilation would be infringement of copyright.
56
 The Article 6 allows the following 
measures: 
Article 6 Decompilation  
1. The authorization of the rightholder shall not be required where 
reproduction of the code and translation of its form within the meaning of 
Article 4 (a) and (b) are indispensable to obtain the information necessary 
to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer 
program with other programs, provided that the following conditions are 
met: 
(a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another person having a 
right to use a copy of a program, or on their behalf by a person authorized 
to so; 
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not 
previously been readily available to the persons referred to in 
subparagraph (a); and (c) these acts are confined to the parts of the 
original program which are necessary to achieve interoperability. 
With “other programs” is meant not only the licensed software but also the software 
which competes with the licensed program.
57
 The Article 6 applies when the company 
refuses to make interoperability information available in a situation where it is 
necessary to achieve interoperability between different software.
58
  The section 2 of the 
Article 6 does not deny developing of competing products but it sets out three 
limitations for decompilation: 
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2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the information obtained 
through its application: 
(a) to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of the 
independently created computer program; 
(b) to be given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability of 
the independently created computer program; or  
(c) to be used for the development, production or marketing of a computer 
program substantially similar in its expression, or for any other act which 
infringes copyright. 
Through the interoperability it is possible to divide market share between the competing 
companies. In this, the decompilation may be the only tool to receive this goal.
59
 The 
Article 6 was applied in Microsoft case in which Microsoft refused to provide 
interoperability information to other developers who wanted to create workgroup server 
operating systems that would interoperate with Microsoft’s Windows system. The 
Commission considered that “the information necessary to ensure that the decompiled 
program works as intended in interoperating with the independently created program is 
information covered by the derogation provided by Article 6.”60 
Interoperability benefits the consumers as they have more options of usable computer 
programs to interoperate with other programs and systems. Also a possibility of 
monopoly pricing decreases because the entry barriers decrease due to the new suppliers 
on the market.
61
 Decompilation is clearly legal nowadays, even though sometimes the 
software companies still try to influence to the development of the interoperability 
between the products.
62
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2.3.4 Network effect and lock-in 
The network effect means the value increase of a product. The increase is the 
consequence of usage by a large group of people of the same product or products which 
are interoperable with that product. The users are able to communicate with a bigger 
group of users and a larger amount of interoperable hardware and software with the 
product is available. The possible problem of the network effect can be that the market 
power accumulates for one supplier or for one technology. This might lead to the 
monopoly position of the supplier or technology owner.
63
 In case there is 
interoperability between different computer programs, everyone benefits from the 
network effect. However, because the right holder of the original software also faces 
competition, the right holder may want to prevent the interoperability between its 
software and other suppliers’ software in order to keep its market position. 64 
One element of the network effect is lock-in situation. Lock-in means that consumers do 
not change to other products even if the other product would be better than the product 
which a consumer is using currently. The reason for this is that there will incur costs 
from the change. This might mean for example that the consumer has to invest to a new 
operating system in order to be capable to use the software he wants or that it is not 
possible to use existing files in the new software or operating system.
65
 Lock-in is a 
negative phenomenon when the actual benefit of using the new software would be 
higher than the actual cost as a consequence of changing to the new software for the 
reason that the consumer continues to use the old one.
66
 The lock-in can cause 
considerable entry barriers and prevent the consumer from choosing technically better 
products.
67
  
As presented above, the network effect and lock-in can prevent consumers to change to 
other competing products even though the competing products were better. The cost of 
                                                     
63
 U.-M. Mylly 2006, 6 – 7. 
64
 U.-M. Mylly 2006, 6. Original reference is Katz, Michael and Shapiro, Carl, Antitrust in Software 
Markets, p. 33, in book Eisenach, Jeffery A. and Lenard, Thomas M., Competition, Innovation and the 
Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999), 29 – 81. 
65
 Välimäki 2009, 252. 
66
 Liebowitz and Margolis 2001, 161. 
67
 U.-M. Mylly 2006, 7. 
19 
 
change can increase so high that it is not profitable for a consumer to change, including 
the time which it would take to learn the new product. 
 
3 ABUSE OF DOMINANT MARKET POSITION 
3.1 Purpose of regulation of dominant market position and abuse of it 
Behavior of companies in a dominant market position is regulated under the Article 102 
the Treaty of on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The dominant market 
position itself or gaining a dominant market position is not prohibited. However, if a 
company has a dominant market position it means that the other companies depend on 
it. A dominant company has stronger position than its competitors and it has possibility 
to close its competitors from the market or prevent an entry to the market. A dominant 
company is also able to take higher prices from its competitors, prevent the competition 
and act against the consumers benefit by decreasing operation or efficiency.  
For that reason, certain responsibility from the company in a dominant position towards 
its competitors and the consumers is expected. The dominant company should not 
conduct in a way which impedes competition in a relevant market. Under the Article 
102, an abuse of a dominant position is prohibited in internal markets, that is, the abuse 
is prohibited within internal market when it affects to the trade between the Member 
States of European Union. 
3.2 Article 102 TFEU  
The Article 102 is applied to monopoly and market power. It concerns behavior of a 
company in a dominant market position.
68
 The Article 102 regulates the abuse of a 
dominant market position. It prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the 
internal market of EU or in a substantial part of it when it may affect to the trade 
between the Member States. A company has been interpreted to concern every company 
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engaged in an economic activity. It is applied to either one company or more companies 
which hold a dominant market position.
69
 This means that in certain circumstances, 
legally independent companies can together collectively hold a dominant position on the 
market.
70
 
Article 102 TFEU  
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. 
The aim of the Article 102 is to maintain an efficient competition within the common 
markets. It aims to prohibit situations where the companies in a dominant market 
position abuse their position and distort competition which affects to the internal 
markets, for example by charging unfair prices, by limiting production or refusing to 
supply to the prejudice of consumers.
71
 
The prohibition sets obligations to the companies towards their business partners and 
competitors. The Commission focuses to conduct which most harms the consumers. In 
its enforcement, the Commission focuses also in ensuring that the markets are 
functioning properly, and that the consumers benefit from the efficiency and 
productivity resulting from the effective competition. This means that the consumers 
benefit from the efficient competition through lower prices, better quality and larger 
choice of new or improved products and services.
72
 The dominant position and abuse of 
it has been subject to many interpretations in the legal analyses.
73
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As set above, the Article does not prohibit the dominant market position itself. The 
market structure that is lacking competition or where the competition has decreased, 
behavior that leads to the dominant market position is not prohibited. The Article only 
prohibits behavior which harms the competitors, the clients and, at the end, the 
consumers.
74
 This is because in a normal business situation the companies aim to 
increase their market share and to be more efficient than their competitors.
75
  
The Article 102 includes list of abuses. The list is considered to be an example list and 
it is not exhaustive.
76
 In addition, other forms of abuses have been defined in the 
applicable case law compared to what is listed in the Article 102 (a-d). 
The Article 102 includes a list of abuses: 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts. 
The Article 102 intervenes to abuse afterwards.
77
 Under the case law, the abuse of the 
dominant position can mean both behaviors which damage directly the consumers and 
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behaviors which damage the consumers through restricting competition.
78
 The 
Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have applied the Article 102 in 
highly controversial ways.
79
 According to Jones and Sufrin, the application of the 
Article 102 has suffered for the reason that there has not been enough proper theoretical 
framework and because of the confusing policy goals. The protection of competitors can 
be considered as a disadvantage to the consumers when it penalizes the efficient pro-
competitive behavior. Also the protection of competitors in order to protect competition 
has been done without a sufficient analysis of the real impact on the consumers. Further, 
it is argued that there is a danger of too many “false positive” errors, that is, over-
enforcement which stops competition and harms the consumers.
80
 
Even if the Article is applied to the abuse of dominant position, it does not include the 
definition of dominant market position.
81
 It only prohibits the abuse of the position. The 
definition is set out in the European Union case law.82 Before any consideration of abuse 
under the Article 102, the following criteria must be established: a) one or more 
undertakings; b) a dominant position; c) the dominant position must be held within 
internal market or a substantive part of it; d) an abuse; and e) an effect on inter-State 
trade. To determine whether a company holds a dominant position and/or whether it has 
abused that position are both difficult questions and difficult to determine.
83
  
3.2.1 The concept of dominant market position 
A dominant market position is a condition for applying the Article 102. However, the 
Article 102 does not include the definition of the dominant market position.
84
 The 
definition is clear when it is a question of a natural monopoly, but in the other market 
situations, the definition of the dominant position is set out in the European Union case 
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law.
85
 The difference between a dominant position and a monopoly is that in monopoly 
situation there is no competition on the relevant market. However, when one company 
or a group of companies holds the dominant position, there is still competition on 
relevant markets but a company or a group of companies have the power to influence to 
the competition significantly.
86
 
The dominant position has been defined in United Brands case by the ECJ.
87
 Since 
United Brands, with dominant market position is usually meant an economic strength of 
a company that makes possible for it to prevent an actual competition on the relevant 
market. Further, because of the economic strength the company has an opportunity to 
operate independently from its competitors, customers and consumers to the significant 
extent. The existence of dominant position is a consequence of a group of factors which 
would not necessarily be crucial alone.
88
 The ECJ has put its focus to company’s market 
power, market share, pricing and stability of dominant position.
89
   The most important 
of these factors is the market share.
90
  
Later in 1979 Hoffman – La Roche case, the ECJ specified the definition set out in 
United Brands.
91
 It stressed that a dominant position did not exclude all of the 
competition and it particularly focused on the ability of the company to influence the 
conditions of competition occurring on the market.
92
 
The Commission’s Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law includes the definition of dominant position.
93
 According 
to the Notice “a dominant position is such that a firm or group of firms would be in a 
position to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers 
and ultimately of its consumers.” Further, the Notice continues that usually the 
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dominant position arise if a company or a group of companies accounts a large share of 
the supply in a given market and that other factors analyzed in assessment, such as entry 
barriers, customer’s capacity to react point in the same direction.94 
In competition law, the economic power of the company cannot be measured by the 
company’s profitability. The small profit margin or occasional losses are not 
controversy with dominant position. Because it is possible to gain remarkable profits in 
an efficient competition, the overall situation needs to be taken into account when 
defining a dominant position. There are several factors for the dominant market position 
in case law. A large market share is a remarkable matter from these factors, but it is not 
an evidence of the dominant position in itself.
95
  
Below it is briefly presented the defining of a dominant market position and relevant 
markets. It is not possible to study the subject more deeply in this thesis as defining the 
dominant position itself is not a simple task. However, the defining of a relevant 
product and geographical markets will be shortly reviewed below as those are 
considered to be the base of defining dominance. 
3.2.2 Defining the dominant market position 
The ECJ has emphasized in the Continental Can case that the dominance can only 
exists in relation to a particular market and not in the abstract. The ECJ found that “the 
definition of the relevant market is of essential significance” to find out whether the 
company holds a dominant position or not.
96
  Based on the Continental Can, the 
Commission follows two-stage procedure to examine the dominance. Firstly, it 
identifies the relevant market and secondly, it scrutinizes the company’s position on that 
market and analyses the competitive constrains which the company faces.
97
   
The ECJ makes the assessment based on the market share of the company and other 
factors which are indicating the dominance, such as an entry barrier. However, the 
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assessment is problematic. The markets are difficult to define, and the process of market 
definition can be difficult to separate from what is supposed to be the second step, that 
is, assessing the company’s market power on that market. It can be difficult to know 
which factors should be taken into account when defining the markets and, on the other 
hand, which factors relate to the assessment of company’s position on the market.98 The 
Commission’s practice has been criticized of defining the markets too narrowly. This 
leads easily to an interpretation that there exists dominance even though the company 
had little market power in reality.   
The Commission’s Notice on market definition sets out three different competitive 
constrains to which the company is subject. Those are demand substitutability, supply 
substitutability and potential competition.
99
 If a company can prevent an actual 
competition and operate independently in the relevant markets in relation to its 
competitors, customers and finally consumers, the company most likely has a dominant 
market position in those relevant markets. In case the customers can easily change to 
other producers substitute products or change the supplier, the conditions for dominant 
position are not fulfilled. Also if the competitors can easily and in a short time start to 
produce substitute products and operate in the same market with the company, there is 
no question of dominant position.
100
  
Defining the markets is difficult to the competition authorities and it is difficult to the 
companies as well. In practice the companies can define their relevant markets to be 
very different from the authorities’ definitions. The company may consider its product 
market much wider than the Commission does. It is, of course, for their benefit but can 
also be the general understanding of the business.
101
 It should not be forgotten that the 
companies compare all the time their market shares to each other’s. However, this 
misinterpretation can lead to very serious consequences for the company. The 
assessment can be seen as a risk to the companies. 
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The relevant market where a company is alleged to hold a dominant position has to be 
defined. If the relevant markets are not defined, it is impossible to assess whether the 
company really is in a dominant position. It has been described above that the dominant 
position is not evaluated only based on market share, because the relevance of the 
market share varies case by case. However, the company’s market share on the relevant 
market is an essential factor in the evaluation.
102
 This means that to find out whether or 
not a company has a dominant position, the relevant product and geographical markets 
need to be defined.  
3.2.2.1 The product market 
The purpose of defining relevant product markets is to find out whether the product has 
substitutes to which the customers could easily turn. It has been considered in legal 
practices that the circumstances of competition and demand and supply structure are 
significant when assessing whether it is possible to substitute a product with other 
products.
103
 The European Union’s case law has put importance on the characteristics 
and intended use of the product when assessing this substitutability from a consumer’s 
side. The Commission’s Notice on market definition includes the quantitative SSNIP 
(Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price) test as the preferred mechanism 
for defining substitutability.
104
  
The relevant product markets have been defined in the following way in the 
Commission’s Notice on market definition:  
“A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which 
are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of 
the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use.”105 
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A company may hold a dominant position as a buyer or a seller for one or more 
products. Usually it is considered that a company abuses its position on the product 
market where it holds a dominant position.
106
 There also exist primary and secondary 
product markets. The secondary products mean products that are purchased after the 
primary product to which they relate.
107
 Competition matters arise when a primary 
product owner also supplies the product or service on the secondary market, the 
aftermarket. Relevant in relation to the subject of this thesis is the scenario where the 
supplier is only source of the product or service in the aftermarket which is compatible 
with the primary product. 
3.2.2.2 The geographical market 
The relevant markets have also a geographical dimension. The relevant geographical 
markets are defined in the Commission Notice as follows: 
 “The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which 
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be 
distinguished from neighboring areas because the condition of competition are 
appreciably different in those area.”108 
The Article 102 also sets out the limitation of geographical market. According to the 
Article, an abuse needs to exist within the internal market or in a substantial part of it.
109
 
3.2.3 Abuse as a concept 
After the relevant markets have been defined, it is possible to assess whether a company 
abuses its position on the relevant markets. The question what is abuse is a vexed 
question.
110
 It should be noticed that the questions whether a company holds a dominant 
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position and whether it has committed an abuse under the Article 102 may be 
interrelated and intertwined.
111
 
The Article 102 includes an example list of abuses of dominant position. The list is not 
exhaustive.
112
 The list does not include for example behaviors which have been 
considered to be abuses in the EU legal practice. The examples concerns mainly 
situations where the company unreasonably exploits its market power in its business. In 
the beginning of the Commission’s practice regarding the Article 102, the Article was 
interpreted in a way which protected dominant company’s trade partners from misuse. 
Later on the Article has been interpreted to cover also other practices, for example when 
the company abstains from supply or refuses to license without a justified reason as a 
consequence of removing all possible competition from the market.
113
 Peculiar for 
abuse is that it reduces further competition on markets where a company’s appearance 
has already impeded it.
114
  
There occur two different main types of abuse of the dominant market position. Those 
are exclusionary abuse and exploitative abuse. Exclusionary abuse means behavior of a 
company in order to foreclose its competitors from the market and this way impeding 
competition. Exploitative abuse is in question when the company advantages its market 
power to exploit its customers. However, the cases where the Article 102 has been 
applied have mainly concerned exclusionary abuses.
115
   
The Article 102 is applicable only when the abuse appreciably affects to trade between 
the Member States. The behavior will affect to the trade between the Member States if it 
interferes with the pattern of trade between the Member States or the structure of 
competition on the internal market.
116
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3.2.3.1 Neighboring markets 
Under the Article 102, also the behavior of a dominant company on a relevant product 
market which affects neighboring markets has been considered as abuse. The Article 
does not define in which product markets the abuse of dominant position has to 
occur.
117
 The Article 102 can be applied if a dominant position on one market makes 
possible an abuse on other markets, that is, a company in a dominant position on one 
market can prevent the competition on other markets.
118
 Condition for applying the 
Article 102 in these situations is that there has to be a connection between a dominant 
market position and the alleged abuse.
119
 
 
4 DUTY TO LICENSE IN DOMINANT MARKET POSITION  
4.1 Collusion between intellectual property rights and competition law  
In chapter two was reviewed the copyright protection of software. The third chapter 
discussed about the definition of dominant market position and what is meant by abuse 
of it. In this chapter four will be reviewed the main question of this thesis; whether a 
dominant company is obliged to admit a right to use its intellectual property rights to its 
competitors and if so in which situations. However, first in this chapter will be reviewed 
whether there is a collision between intellectual property rights and competition laws.  
The intellectual property rights and competition law have different grounds. Under 
intellectual property laws the right holder has the exclusive right to dominate its 
intellectual property regardless of the market power it has. Competition law on the other 
hand takes in to account markets and market power of the company. According to 
Mikko Välimäki, from the point of view of economics, it can be said that the aims of 
intellectual property rights and competition law are converging and there exists only an 
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apparent conflict between these two fields of laws.
120
 After all, both of them have the 
same objectives; they aim to intensify competition through new innovations for the 
consumers’ welfare.  
Intellectual property rights are generally regulated under the national laws, though there 
is also some EU level regulation. The Member States intellectual property laws have 
sometimes created a tension with the EU competition rules. Although intellectual 
property rights have a great importance in a modern commercial world their interaction 
with EU competition law is complex.
121
 The complexity can be seen not only in relation 
to competition law but also in relation to the free movement of goods and services and 
the operation on single market. Firstly, the exclusive right can be used as a mechanism 
to prevent importation of goods and services from another Member State. Secondly, 
intellectual property rights can constitute an entry barrier on the market and lead to an 
abuse of a dominant market position in the purpose of the Article 102. Thirdly, the 
terms of license agreements between business partners may include restrictions of 
competition when the object of the agreement is intellectual property.
122
 
The possession of intellectual property rights do not create automatically a dominant 
market position, and holding a dominant market position is not prohibited under the EU 
jurisdiction, that is, a holding a dominant market position does not create assumption of 
abuse of it. Intellectual property right may, though, strengthen a lot company’s 
competition position especially when the intellectual property is the core business of the 
company. The abuse of the dominant market position can come into the question when 
there are no substitute products for intellectual property or substitute products exist but 
only in a very limited amount. The conflict of intellectual property rights and 
competition law normally exists when used a narrow market definition. In this case the 
substitute of supply has also meaning, that is, whether the competitors can easily begin 
to supply substitute products.
123
 
The creator of an intellectual property has the exclusive right to its product and this can 
lead to a legal monopoly. The legal monopoly leads to market power and even 
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monopoly under competition laws. According to Luc Peeperkorn there can exist a 
matter under dispute “that competition law would take away what IP law is providing”. 
If there exist early copying of an innovation and free riding on an innovator’s efforts 
this harms the incentive to innovate. It should be remembered that intellectual property 
laws grant to the innovator a legal monopoly. However, according to Peeperkorn both 
intellectual property rights and competition law aims to the same which is promoting 
the consumers’ welfare. Intellectual property rights’ aim is not to promote an 
innovator’s welfare, but incentive the technical progress to the benefit of the 
consumers.
124
 
The lack of the incentive effect would create follow-on innovations and unnecessary 
long periods of high prices for the consumers. Unnecessary long periods for high prices 
would be in hand when the right holder obtains market power and where the intellectual 
property rights protects this monopoly position longer than is needed to incentive 
innovations. In order to have a right balance between over- and under-protecting of the 
innovators’ efforts there should be taken into account that intellectual property rights 
differs from and are normally less absolute than tangible property rights. The 
intellectual property rights are often limited in duration; not protected against parallel 
development by others; and they can lose their value once they become public. The 
competition policy aims to promote the consumers’ welfare as well but by protecting 
competition as a driving force of efficient markets and providing the best quality at the 
lowest price. For this reason the relevant question is not one of the conflict but a 
complementarity and possibly adjustment in the individual cases.
125
 
From the point of view of competition the intellectual property rights give the exclusive 
right for the right holder and protection against third parties. This protection does not 
automatically mean that the company has a dominant position. It is not against the 
Article 102 either that the company in a dominant position uses its exclusive right, 
provided the company does not abuse its position.
126
 According to traditional paradigm 
based on industrial production the purpose of intellectual property rights is to produce 
the exclusive right for its right holder as a reward from a generally profitable 
development work. The industrial companies, especially software companies, invest to 
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research and product development and this way succeeds to improve production 
methods. The company can exploit its exclusive right by itself or it can license it for 
other companies against compensation.
127
  
In the EU’s legal practice the abuse of intellectual property rights can mean situations 
where the company dives markets or charges too high license fees. Other situations 
where the company can abuse its intellectual property right are the refusal to use its 
intellectual property rights and the refusal to license it to third parties or by other 
methods excluding its competitors from the market and preventing new technologies.
128
   
There are two important points of view when applying the Article 102 to intellectual 
property rights. Firstly, what is the extent of intellectual property which is considered to 
be required to keep the intellectual property owner having a dominant market position? 
Secondly, there is the question whether the holding or exploitation of intellectual 
property rights can constitute an abuse of a dominant market position, and if so in which 
circumstances. In case a protected product is a part of wider market the intellectual 
property rights does not itself comprise the dominant position. But if the relevant 
market comprises only a product protected by the intellectual property rights then there 
will be a de facto dominance for the reason that the intellectual property rights will 
constitute an entry barrier preventing the supply or entrants.
129
 
The tension between intellectual property rights and competition law is a consequence 
of the exclusive right of the intellectual property’s owner which prevents the 
competitors to exploit the protected product due to the right holder has a right to refuse 
licensing its product. However, Petri Kuoppamäki does not see there is tension because 
the objectives of both competition law and intellectual property rights are converging. 
The both legal fields aim to dynamic efficiency and economic welfare in general. 
However, intellectual property rights and competition law can be in contradiction in 
individual cases even they are not in contradiction in objective level.
130
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The convergence of intellectual property rights and competition law can be considered 
also as a classic question. It can be asked whether the competition law receives priority 
over intellectual property rights or the other way around; whether intellectual property 
rights should be considered as any other property; or the question should be argued with 
cost-benefit-analysis.
131
 Kuoppamäki considers that when applying competition law the 
intellectual property rights should be considered as any other property. It is one form of 
asset types. Intellectual property right possess the same freedom of contract and 
protection of property as do tangible property, and the same principles of competition 
law applies to the use of both of them. However, the special features of intellectual 
property right need to be taken into consideration. It is true that competition law 
restricts a dominant company’s possibility to exploit fully its intellectual property rights 
but by competition law it is also possible to protect the intellectual property rights of a 
weaker party.
132
   
The relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law is sometimes 
complex. Especially when competition law has required dominant companies to license 
their rights to third parties against dominant companies’ will. As stated before, owning 
an intellectual property does not automatically lead to an abuse of dominant market 
position, still when certain circumstances are present holding an intellectual property 
can be an abuse under Article 102. 
The fundamental question, however, is whether intellectual property rights and 
competition law are in conflict or whether they have same goal but different routes. It 
can be seen that both aims to protect consumers’ welfare and both have the same 
objective. In order to get complete picture how intellectual property rights operates 
under the Article 102 these two needs to be reviewed together. 
133
 Therefore these will 
be treated together under this chapter four.  
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4.1.1 Refusal to supply  
Refusal to supply has been considered to be one form of abuse under the Article 102.  If 
a dominant company refuses to supply its products or services or grant access to its 
premises the dominant company may infringe the Article 102.
134
 Also if a dominant 
company is willing to supply its product or services or grant access to it premises but 
knows the offer includes terms which are unacceptable for the company may be 
considered to infringe the Article 102 , that is, the company practically refuses to supply 
because it knows the customer will not purchase the product or service with the terms it 
offers.
135
 These kinds of behaviors are an example of prohibited based on a dominant 
position. In other words a non-dominant company does not infringe the Article by 
unilateral refusal to supply. Though, the dominant company has no absolute obligation 
to supply everyone who requests a supply.
136
  
The refusal to supply is normally classified as an exclusionary abuse. This means the 
dominant company refuses to supply a product or service or grant an access to its 
facilities which the other party needs to be able to compete on the market. Often a 
company has a dominant position in an upstream market but operates also in 
downstream market and refuses to deliver the facilities to competitors on that 
downstream market.
137
 The refusal to supply may also mean , for example, supplying 
with discriminatory terms or in a way that exploits the upstream dominance to the 
prejudice of the competitors. In other words the refusal to supply does not need to be 
absolute. There are also other forms of abuses such as tiding which can be seen as a 
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refusal to supply.
138
 These forms of infringements are, however, left outside the scope 
of this thesis. 
As said the refusal to supply is an abuse of dominant position in certain situations. If the 
company has a justified reason not to supply, it should not be obliged to deliver. 
However, it has been very difficult for the companies in dominant position to prove that 
the refusal to supply an existing customer is objectively justified.
139
 Commercial 
Solvents case was the first case where refusal to supply was considered to be 
infringement of the Article 102. In this case Commercial Solvents which was in a 
dominant position on upstream markets excluded competitors from downstream markets 
by its refusal.
140
 It concerned outright refusal to supply existing customers. Later in 
Telemarketing case refusal to supply was expanded to concern new customers as 
well.
141
 In both cases the refusal concerned competition on a downstream market.
142
 
In Volvo v. Veng the ECJ found that refusing to supply when it is appealed to 
intellectual property rights was not abuse of dominant position.
143
 In here Volvo refused 
to admit user right to car’s reconditioned units to third parties. Volvo had a model right 
to those reconditioned units and it wanted to deny from third parties the possibility to 
supply these reconditioned units for car repair. The ECJ decided Volvo had a right to 
base its refusal on its intellectual property rights.
 
However, the ECJ noted that in 
exceptional circumstances the refusal to supply can be considered infringing the Article 
102. Further, the ECJ stated that it may have been abuse of dominant position if, a) 
refusal to supply reconditioned units for an independent garage was based on arbitrary; 
b) there would exist unreasonable pricing; and c) a company decides to stop producing 
spear parts for a car model which is still commonly used.
 144
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Later the ECJ decided in Magill case that refusing to license intellectual property rights 
can be abuse of dominant position.
145
 The ECJ noted that refusal to license itself is not 
abuse of dominant position but in Magill was question of exceptional circumstance and 
for that reason it could be considered as an abuse of dominant position. If the right 
holder produces by itself a product based on its intellectual property rights the company 
may be obliged to license its intellectual property if the right holder is not able to 
correspond to demand.
146
 Magill case will be reviewed later more closely because of its 
importance as an essential facility case. 
In Tiercé Ladbroke case a Belgian betting company, Tiercé Ladbroke, wanted TV-
broadcasting rights for horseraces arranged in France in order to exercise betting 
business in Belgium. The Court of First Instance (CFI), however, decided that 
broadcasting rights were not necessary for betting business activity.
147
 In here were set 
out the grounds when refusing to license could be abuse of dominant market position. 
The CFI found refusal could be against the Article 102 when: a) it is a question about a 
product or service which is necessary for exercising the business and there exists no 
substitute product or service; or b) entry of a new product or service is prevent despite 
of the fact that there is special, ongoing and regular consumer demand for the product or 
service.
148
 
A dominant company has not an absolute obligation to supply, but in certain situations 
the refusal to supply may be infringe the Article 102. There is cases where the refusal to 
supply has been considered an abuse but also cases where it has been found not to 
infringe the Article 102. In practice the company chooses to whom they conclude the 
license agreement and with which terms. If a company considers it is unfavorable for it 
to conclude a contract with certain customers it can refuse not to. However, if the 
refusal to supply may be considered an abuse it leads to the situation where the 
company should not refuse to supply in order to ensure it does not infringe competition 
laws. 
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4.1.2 Duty to license 
The first case where the duty to supply was dealt with was Commercial Solvents case in 
1973.
149
 After that duty to supply has been developed in the EU case law. By duty to 
license is meant that a company in a dominant position may have a duty to supply in 
some situations in order to effective competition. In regard to the case law the duty to 
license can be seen as a remedy under essential facility. In other words if refusing to 
license is not an abuse, a duty to license is not a right remedy. However, there should be 
some other abusive behavior than only refusal to license in order to oblige a company in 
a dominant position to license.
150
 The questions are here when and why a company has 
a duty to supply due to effective competition. The duty to supply interferes to the 
principle of freedom of contract that the one should be free to conclude agreements with 
whom one chooses.
151
  
Duty to license has been under the Commission’s scrutiny in several cases. In IMS 
Health case IMS Health was considered to have a dominant market position in sales 
statics market.
 152
 Further, the Commission considered IMS Health abused its dominant 
position due to IMS Health removed all competition from the relevant market by 
denying to license its system. IMS Health appealed that it has a right not to admit 
license, due to its copyright, for its competitors in those markets where the copyright 
relates to. The Commission however found that copyright was not a justified reason for 
refusal when it prevents all competition on the market. The Commission obliged IMS 
Health to license its product to its competitors. After IMS Health case the precondition 
to order duty to license is that the company wanting to license a product has to bring 
new products including new features demanded by consumers onto the markets and the 
product has to. In legal research it has been noted that IMS Health case extended the 
scope of duty to license set in Magill case.
153
  
The latest example of applying the essential facility doctrine in intellectual property 
field is Microsoft case. Microsoft had a dominant position in operating systems and 
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refused to give interface information to its competitors. The Commission decided 2004 
that Microsoft’s behavior restricts technical development to the detriment of 
consumers.
154
 To be able to produce software which runs in the operating system the 
interface information is necessary. In 2007 the CFI decided that frustration of technical 
development beside the entry to the market of new product or genesis of a new market 
may be considered a reason for compulsory licensing when it is question of a company 
in a dominant position.
155
  
The duty to supply should not be applied to intellectual properties as it is applied to 
physical products. When it is necessary to intervene to intellectual properties and use it 
by means of competition law, the aims and content of intellectual property rights needs 
to be taken into account. Obligation to license can mean to a company invalidation of 
the monetary value of its intellectual property rights.
156
  
4.2 The essential facility doctrine 
4.2.1 Essential facility as a concept 
In legal practice a dominant company’s refusal to supply its assets to its competitors on 
neighboring markets has been considered to be an abuse of dominant market position 
when the asset has been essential for competitors in order to compete on the relevant 
markets. In these situations a company has been obliged to grant access to its assets if 
there have been exceptional circumstances in hand. Under these cases has been 
developed the essential facility doctrine.
157
  
By essential facility is meant something owned or controlled by a vertically integrated 
dominant company to which other companies need access in order to provide products 
or services to their customers.
158
 The essential facility is considered to be hardly or 
impartibly duplicable or it is not profitable to duplicate it. The essential facility is also 
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so important for competition that the effective competition is eliminated without access 
to it. Typically, there exist two different markets; the upstream market where the 
essential facility is held and the downstream market where the competition is 
eliminated.
159
 A dominant company’s refusal to grant access to an essential facility 
which it holds over is a breach of the special responsibility of the company.
160
 
The essential facility is an exception of the general rule that a company has no 
obligation to deal with its competitors. For this reason it has been developed in the case 
law the four cumulative conditions under the essential facility doctrine. These four 
cumulative criteria have to be met before the dominant company can be obliged to grant 
access to its asset: 1) the access to the facility is indispensable for competitor in order to 
exercise competition on the relevant market, provided there is no substitute and it is 
practically impossible for competitor to develop a substitute alone or together with other 
competitors; 2) refusal to supply eliminates competition on the relevant market; 3) 
refusal prevents appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer 
demand; and 4) there in no objective justification for refusal. 
The facility has to be indispensable for competitor in order to provide products or 
service to the customers. Whether the facility is indispensable the following issues need 
to be evaluated. First, it needs to be evaluated whether there exist substitutes for the 
facility from competitor’s perspective. 161  If so the facility cannot be considered 
essential. In addition the facility should be a “strict complement” in competitor’s 
production process or in operation.
162
 Thirdly, indispensability requires consumers’ 
demand. If consumers consider there is no substitute for asset on the market there is 
consumer’s demand. 163   And fourthly, it is not possible for competitors alone or 
together to produce a substitute.
164
  This means that the essential facility is hardly or 
impracticably duplicable or it is not profitable to duplicate it. According to Reiffen and 
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Kleit,”if assets cannot be economically reproduced by another company but are 
economically essential to all producers of same good, then all producers of that good 
should have equal access to the asset.”165  
The concept of essential facility requires two different markets, the upstream market 
which possess the facility and downstream market where the competition is prevented. 
Usually in the essential facility cases question is vertically integrated companies which 
operates both on upstream and downstream markets.
166
 It is not a question of essential 
facility if there does not exist competition in the downstream market regardless of 
refusal to supply.
167
  
The refusal to admit access to an essential facility may constitute an infringement under 
the EU competition law. In this kind of situation it is possible to oblige an infrastructure 
holder to admit a license to infrastructure with reasonable and non-discriminable terms. 
The common opinion actually is that the facility holder should be obliged to admit a 
license in case the refusal would lead to an entry barrier or cause serious and permanent 
harm in consequence the business would be unprofitable.
168
 However, granting an 
access has to be technically possible without extra investments or capacity increases.
169
  
According to Jones and Sufrin, there should be some kind of way of identifying 
facilities to which access by competitor is truly essential rather than merely desirable. 
They considers that even the facilities are identified there may be practical problems 
about access and sharing. Granting an access has to be technically possible without 
extra investments or capacity increases.
170
 Because some facilities have limited capacity 
such as ports, it should be then decided which competitors should be given the access to 
that facility.
171
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4.2.1.1 The development of the essential facility doctrine under US law 
The essential facility doctrine has its origin in US antitrust law.
172
 The first essential 
facility doctrine case is Terminal Railroad Association of Saint Lois by the US Supreme 
Court from 1912.
 173
 The Terminal Railroad Association of Saint Lois had bought three 
independent terminal facilities operating the railroad traffic through St. Lois over 
Mississippi river. The association was controlling all railway bridges and switch yards 
into and out of St. Lois. St. Lois was significant junction for east-west rail traffic. For 
particular railroads, which were non-owners of terminal, were denied access to the 
terminal, and this way excluding them from competing with the owners of terminal or 
they were required to pay higher prices than the owners paid.
174
 The Supreme Court 
found that when a private company or a joint of companies holds a facility which is 
sufficiently essential for its competitors and for functioning competition on the relevant 
market, the facility may not be used to prevent the operation of competitors neither 
impede functioning competition on the markets which are dependent on the facility. 
One of the leading essential facility cases in US antitrust law is MCI Communications 
Corporation v. AT&T case from 1983. 
175
 AT&T was a monopolist telecommunication 
provider. MCI wanted the access to AT&T’s local service network in long distance 
services which AT & T denied from it. By refusal AT &T limited those services which 
MCI would offer to its customers. The refusal to grant access was found unlawful and 
the court based on its decision to the essential facility doctrine. Under this case was 
developed a four cumulative conditions. The company holding an essential facility have 
the duty to grant access to essential facility with non-discriminatory terms, provided the 
following four conditions are present: 1) a monopolist controls the facility; 2) a 
competitor is not able to practically or reasonably to duplicate it; 3) the monopolist 
denies the use of the facility; and 4) it is feasible to provide the facility.
 176
 These four 
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cumulative conditions have been applied and developed later on in essential facility 
cases.
177
 
The essential facility doctrine has been developed mostly in practice of lower courts’ 
and in legal literature where some of the US Supreme Court cases have been classified 
to be essential facility cases. The essential facility doctrine has been developed in three 
steps. In first step were the US Supreme Court’s decisions where a company holding an 
infrastructure or bottleneck was obliged to admit access to its facility. In second step, 
the US Supreme Court’s decisions were studied in legal science when the concept of 
essential facility was discovered. At the last stage lower courts started to apply essential 
facility doctrine in their decision.
178
 However, the US Supreme Court hasn’t explicitly 
used essential facility in its decisions.
179
 This same applies to the European Court of 
Justice and will be discussed below.  
4.2.1.2 The development of the essential facility doctrine in EU 
The essential facility doctrine became a significant trend in EU’s competition law in 
1990s.
180
 The Commission made first reference to the essential facility doctrine in 1992 
in B&I v. Sealink case.
181
 In here the Sealink was on owner and operator of the port of 
Holyhead as well as a ferry operator at the same route than B&I. Because of the 
structural factors of the harbor the timetable changes of the harbor hindered B&I’s 
loading and uploading actions in benefit of Sealink. The Commission laid down in its 
decision that a dominant company which holds an essential facility may have to provide 
access competitors with non-discriminatory terms.
182
 In B&I v. Sealink the essential 
facility was defined as “a facility or infrastructure without access to competitors cannot 
provide services to their customers”.183 In another harbor decision Sea Containers/Stena 
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Sealink the Commission confirmed that the duty to supply essential facilities set out in 
B&I v. Sealink apply to new as well as existing customers.
184
 
The essential facility was used first time by the ECJ in Oscar Bronner case.
 185
  Bronner 
can be kept a leading essential facility judgment of the ECJ. In here the ECJ set out the 
limited circumstances in which the access to a facility will be commanded.
186
  The case 
will be studied more closely in the next chapter. As stated above the European Court of 
Justice has not explicitly referred to the essential facility doctrine even though the 
doctrine has effected to EU’s competition law, having actually an important role, by the 
practices of the Commission. 
It can be seen that the object of the essential facility doctrine has changed in last 100 
years from railways to telecommunication and further to networks, intellectual 
properties and information services which are essential for the information technology 
society. In chapter 4.3 will be continued studying of the essential facility doctrine’s 
development in relation to intellectual property rights. 
4.2.1.3 Oscar Bronner case 
Oscar Bronner case is one of the early cases where the essential facility doctrine was 
applied by the ECJ though without mentioning doctrine itself in its arguments.
 187
 The 
case has been considered to be one of the clearest essential facility doctrine cases in the 
European case law.
188
 In Bronner was the question about whether the respondent, 
Mediaprint, abused its dominant market position when it rejected to offer a home 
delivery service of daily newspapers for Bronner against reasonable compensation. 
Bronner was Mediaprint’s competitor. The ECJ needed to answer to the question 
considering the Article 102 whether Mediaprint, which has a remarkable market share 
in the Member State’s daily newspaper markets and Member States only home delivery 
service system covering whole country, committed to abuse of the dominant market 
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position when denying to offer this system to its competitors. Bronner appealed that it 
wouldn’t be economically wise for it to provide own home delivery system or provide it 
jointly with other competitors. 
Mediaprint published daily newspapers Neue Kronen Zeitung and Kurier which have 
significant market share in Austria. Beside the significant market share Mediaprint 
provided a home delivery service established for its newspapers covering the whole 
state. It was only this kind of system in Austria. The idea was that the newspapers were 
delivered straight to customers early in the morning. 
Oscar Bronner, however, published and delivered a daily newspaper called Der 
Standard. It claimed Mediaprint should be obliged to stop abusing of its dominant 
market position and take Der Standard part of its home delivery system against 
reasonable compensation. Bronner argued that mailing through the post is not equal to 
home delivery system because the customers would receive their magazines at noon, not 
early in the morning. Bronner also argued that it wasn’t profitable to provide own home 
delivery system as there wasn’t so many customers who ordered Der Standard-
magazine. Bronner argued that Mediaprint hold an essential facility and it was obliged 
to offer access to the services for competitors against the terms which equals normal 
market terms.  
Mediaprint responded that to start up the home delivery system required major 
investments from it. Also the capacity of the systems would be exceeded if all 
publishers would be attached to the system. Mediaprint argued the dominant position 
does not oblige it to support competition by favoring its competitors. It continued that 
also in dominant position the company can freely decide with whom it wants to deal. It 
referred to Magill-case that duty to license can be applied only in the exceptional 
circumstances. Moreover, Mediaprint argued it had an objective ground for its denial. 
The system could be overloaded if Der Standard would be attached to it; or it could be 
even impossible to attach Der Standard to the system. 
45 
 
The ECJ considered referring to Magill that the four factors which would have to be 
present before the refusal could be an abuse were not fulfilled in here.
189
 Those factors 
are: a) the denial would eliminate all competition in the downstream market from the 
competitor; b) there is no objective justification for denial; c) the access has to be 
indispensable for company’s operation on the market, that is, meaning the system could 
not be replaced factually and possibility with any other system; and d) there are no 
actual or potential substitute for facility.
190
 
The ECJ was restrictive toward the obligation to grant an access to facilities. It 
emphasized that the denial must be likely to eliminate all competition from the company 
wanting the access, not to make the competition harder. Access must also be 
indispensable because there must be no actual or potential substitute. The ECJ argued 
there exist other ways to deliver daily newspapers and there was no technical, juridical 
or economic reasons which would prevent or make unreasonably difficult to establish 
an own nationwide home delivery system alone or jointly with other publishers. In here 
the access could have been indispensable only if it was not economically viable to 
create a home-delivery system for a newspaper with a comparable circulation to the 
dominant company’s.191 In Bronner the Opinion of General Advocate Jacobs reminded 
the Court for the fact that the primary purpose of the Article 102 was to protect the 
consumers, not the competitors.
192
 
In Bronner many questions were left open such as problems of pricing, how the 
company owning the facility should deal with competing claims for access or the role of 
competition authorities in essential facilities scenarios. However, in Bronner the ECJ 
touched on the question whether the case law on intellectual property rights (, that is, 
Magill) is applicable to other property rights.
193
 
Bronner was a quite simple case in itself. It concerned a privet company’s facility. The 
facility was built up with its own resources and the competing company was operating 
satisfactorily on the downstream market without access to the facility. The ECJ made 
                                                     
189
 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KC v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG 
and others 1998, para. 41. 
190
 Ibid. 
191
 Ibid., paras. 45 – 46. 
192
 Jones and Sufrin 2011, 492. 
193
 Ibid., 494. 
46 
 
clear that facilities are not lightly to be defined essential or access lightly required. The 
situation would be different if the ECJ had considered in Bronner the situation suitable 
for the application of the doctrine.
194
 Bronner wasn’t dependent in Mediaprint’s home 
delivery system in its publishing and delivery operation. Access to the system would 
probably make Bronners business more efficient, but the purpose of competition law is 
to protect competition, not individual competitors.  
It has been argued that the decision of Bronner case will lessen appealing to abuse of 
dominant market position in the cases where competitor wants to exploit investments of 
the dominant company to easy or increase the efficiency its own business. However, 
Tuomas Mylly stresses the fact that every situation is different and the evaluation is 
always made separately on each market and competition situation.
195
  
4.2.2 Essential facility doctrine and intellectual property rights 
The essential facility doctrine has traditionally been applied to tangible property as 
presented above. However, the doctrine is nowadays applied to intellectual properties as 
well. This has aroused discussion whether the doctrine can be applied to intellectual 
properties at all. In other words can intellectual properties such as software or technical 
standards or interoperability information be kept an essential facility?
196
 The fact is 
however that the essential facility has been applied to intellectual property rights. 
Moreover, many central facilities are nowadays protected by intellectual property rights 
which mean those are also more important for competition. The intellectual property 
may imply that the requirement of indispensability is satisfied quite easily in situations 
of unique information and standards.
 197
  
The same four cumulative criteria are applied to intellectual property rights than 
tangible property.  The specific characters of intellectual properties protected under 
relevant laws should be, however, the central competition law principles underlying the 
essential facility doctrine can be applied.
 
These characters are discussed in this 
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chapter.
198
 The logic of four cumulative criteria is not absolutely clear. One way is to 
review the criteria is that the indispensability covers also the elimination of competition 
criterion.
199
 This is the logic which has been used in here.  
Indispensability analysis has been similar in cases which concerns tangible properties 
and intellectual properties.
200
 It has always been investigated in the essential facility 
cases whether or not there exist substitutes for the product. If there is a substitute for 
intellectual property on the market, it is not indispensable. The sufficient argument 
cannot be that the other intangible facility is less advantageous for the perspective of 
competitor. As required in regard to tangible products, the competitor has to modify its 
operation or production for the already available facility if that kind of exist. The 
purpose is not to give the access just because it is the easiest and cheapest option for the 
competitor. However, it is provided that the available facility enables entry to the 
market and maintenance effective competition on the market.
 201
  
One requirement for indispensability is that the facility protected by intellectual 
property rights has to bring a “strict complement” to competitor’s operation and 
production process. In Tiercé Ladbroke case this requirement was not met.
 202
 It is also 
required that there is consumers demand for the new product.  If from consumers’ point 
of view there are enough substitutes on the market, the facility is not considered being 
indispensable in general to competition. It is not enough that it is indispensable just for 
some competitors but it has to be indispensable in general to competition.  
The indispensability requirement which has been applied, for example, in Bronner 
applies to intellectual properties as well. The requirement set out in Bronner is that if it 
is practicable and economically feasible for competitor alone or with other competitors 
to develop a substitute enabling the competition the facility is not indispensable. The 
development of substitute should considered preference over duty to license.
203
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The new product criterion has been set in the case law concerning intellectual property 
rights. It was developed in Magill by the ECJ. In this case it was considered to be a part 
of the cumulative criteria and used later in IMS Health and Microsoft cases.  New 
product criterion can be seen as an additional criterion beside the four cumulative 
criteria , that is, if the company prevents entry of a new product on the market by 
refusing to license its facility it can be considered an abuse of dominant position. It is 
however provided that there is demand for the new product among the consumers. In 
Microsoft case the new product criterion was developed further. It has been argued that 
list of exceptional circumstances of situations where the duty to license is possible was 
not an exhaustive list. After Magill it has been modified in other cases such as in 
Microsoft. The new product criterion is however not applicable in all intellectual 
property cases. 
204
 
As said above in Microsoft the new product criterion was developed further.  In here the 
new product criterion could not become in question because Microsoft itself was 
producing its own software on work group server operating system market.
205
 The 
Commission however found that there is limitation of technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers and that was considered to fulfill the new product criterion.
206
 In 
other words the limitation of technical development prevented entry of new products. 
Under the new product criterion has been also evaluated the incentive to innovation 
from competitors side. In Microsoft it was evaluated does the refusal to license reduces 
competitors’ incentive to innovate. 207 The refusal to license could affect negatively to 
the development on the relevant markets on the basis of competition on the 
development of products which are different than the facility of a dominant company.
208
 
The incentive of Microsoft to innovation was discussed under objective justification 
argumentation.
209
 Microsoft argued that its refusal to license is objectively justified due 
to its intellectual property right. It considers the duty to license would affect as 
                                                     
204
 Ibid., 517 – 519. 
205
 Ibid., 519. 
206
 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities 2007, para. 665. 
207
 T. Mylly, Intellectual Property and European Economic Constitutional Law. The Trouble of Private 
and Informational Law. 2009, 523. 
208
 Ibid., 523. 
209
 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities 2007, para. 659. 
49 
 
disincentive for its future invest in creation of more intellectual property.
210
 However, it 
was considered that the intellectual property right itself is not objective justification 
when the exceptional circumstances exist. 
Essential for intellectual property is that it does not diminish in use. The owner of 
intellectual property can continue to exploiting, for example, software also after 
licensing it for third parties. Because of this non-rivalrous nature of intellectual 
properties it is also possible to share and give access to it. It is feasible to admit user 
right to the intellectual property, especially to software, and there does not come up 
same kind of technical obstacles to share it as with tangible products.
211    
The same four cumulative criteria can be applied to intellectual property as has been 
applied other properties. However, the special characters of intellectual property rights 
should be taken into account when applying essential facility doctrine.  
4.2.3 Criticism toward essential facility doctrine in relation to intellectual 
property rights 
Duty to license intellectual property rights includes certain problems. The question of 
the interaction of competition law and intellectual property rights is much disputed in 
competition law.
212
  Some of the legal writers consider the essential facility doctrine 
does not apply to intellectual property rights.
213
 For example in Germany where 
essential facility doctrine is part of German’s competition law has left the intellectual 
property rights outside the doctrine.
214
 These legal writers consider that the questions 
regarding incentive effect and balance should be solved by intellectual property right 
rules; therefore competition law should not be applied to intellectual property rights as 
the intellectual property legislation should be able to solve these questions by its own 
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rules.
215
 The debate in this matter concerns whether intellectual property rights are 
already provided by own law and that compulsory licensing of intellectual property 
rights is a dangerous disincentive to innovation.
216
  
Each company on the market aims competitive advantage compared to its competitors 
by creating new and better products in order to achieve the goal. Developing new 
products requires huge investments and is time-consuming and therefore the company 
should be compensated for its efforts and investments. These investments are rewarded 
by exclusive right. This constitutes for competitors a need to develop optional 
technologies and technical solutions. If the company is obliged to license its intellectual 
property there is risk that competitors “free rides” at the expense of its innovations. The 
duty to license the software could have the opposite effect than incentive for new 
innovations what is the aim of intellectual property rights and competition law.
217
 
Neither it is against Article if a company wants to keep its dominant position. It does 
not abuse its dominant position just by refusing to license the software.
 218
 
According to Kuoppamäki, however, the debate of the essential facility doctrine relates 
to meaningful of competition law, the market power which is required for application of 
doctrine as well as realistic measures of competition authority. When applying the 
essential facility doctrine there has to be weighed the freedom of the contract against 
importance of entry to the market.
219
 In other words there needs to be weighed two 
different collective goods against each other. If the duty to license is ordered, the 
question is on which kind of terms the access is granted and who will set the terms. If it 
is the assets holder the terms might end up be unreasonable or if it is the Commission 
the authority will act as a price regulator.
220
 
The intellectual property rights and competition law have a different approach. 
Intellectual property law does not take into account market power, the structure of 
markets and dynamic level of these. Intellectual property rights are applied in a same 
way in each situation. However, the competition law is based on defining the markets 
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and evaluating effect of companies’ actions’ to markets in each case separately. This 
means it is easier to take into account a market situation and dynamic side of markets in 
competition law.
221
 
Finally, according to Mylly the main debate should not be whether the essential facility 
doctrine applies to intellectual property rights.
222
  The precedents of the essential facility 
doctrine should not be seen as rule type precedents, which frame a coherent and general 
suitability of criteria of the essential facility doctrine. The essential facility doctrine 
should rather be seen as a description of a category of situations where it may be 
grounded to apply the basis competition law norms.
223
 Intellectual property rights 
should be considered as any property right but the special features of intellectual 
property rights should be taken into account in order to give relevance to intellectual 
property rights incentive function. Mylly sees this as a way to avoid conflicts between 
intellectual property rights and competition law target systems level.
224
 
The essential facility doctrine has been a debated issue under the US law. Areeda has 
considered under the US law that the essential facility doctrine should be used with 
extremely carefulness, especially because it can be a barrier for new innovations. 
Areeda has a critical point of view to the doctrine because of doctrines’ dangerous 
disincentive to innovations. He has set out six principles that should limit application of 
the essential facilities concept. First of all, there is no general duty to share. For this 
reason compulsory access is and should be very exceptional. Secondly, company’s 
facility is essential only when competitor(s) cannot compete effectively on the market 
without it and there is no duplication or practical alternatives available. Further, the 
competitor has to be essential for competition on the market. Thirdly, a company 
shouldn’t be obliged to deal unless it is probable that the obligation substantially 
improves competition on the market by reducing prices or by increasing output or 
innovation. Fourthly, even if above mentioned three conditions are satisfied, denial for 
access is never per se unlawful; legitimate business purpose always saves the company. 
Also the intention of company is meaningful. It should be asked whether the company 
had an intention to exclude the competitors from the market by improper means. And 
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finally, the courts should impose a duty to deal that cannot explain or adequately and 
reasonably supervise. The problem should be deemed irremediable by competition law 
when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls 
characteristic of a regulatory agency.
225
  
Also Herbert Hovenkamp sees the essential facility doctrine complicated: 
“So-called essential facilities doctrine is one of the most troublesome, 
incoherent and unmanageable bases for Sherman section 2 liability. The 
antitrust world would almost certainly be better place if it were jettisoned, 
with a little fine tuning of the general doctrine of the monopolist’s refusal 
to deal to fill in the resulting gaps”.226 
The assets to which access by competitors is truly essential need to be identified. 
However, it may not be always possible to access or share the assets. If the facility may 
has a limited capacity the question is to whom the access should be given.
227
 Over-
enthusiastic approach to essential facility may lead companies to share its assets which 
the company has developed over several years at great expense with competitors’. This 
might remove incentives to innovations and injure the public interest.
228
  
4.3 European Union case law 
Under this section is reviewed decisions of the European Union Court of Justice, the 
Court of First Instance and the Commission which includes intellectual property rights 
and applying the Article 102. The essential facility doctrine has been developed under 
these cases in relation to the intellectual property rights.  
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4.3.1 Magill case 
The ECJ made decision in Magill case in 1995.
229
 The case considered the relation of 
the intellectual property rights, more precisely copyright, and the competition law. The 
ECJ considered in Magill that the intellectual property rights were used against EU 
competition law rules. The real questions in here were the definition of dominant 
market position and the refusal to license intellectual property rights. The decision 
received a lot of attention. There was also a concern that the decision would shrink 
protection of the intellectual property rights.  
The case concerned three television broadcasting companies; RTE, an Irish publisher 
having a statutory monopoly over TV broadcasting in Ireland, and ITV and BBC having 
a duopoly over TV broadcasting in UK.  Most of the TV viewers in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland could receive the channels of all these broadcasting companies. RTE 
and BBC owned the copyright in the program listings for their own channels and ITV 
owned IBA franchise channels. These three companies each published a weekly 
program guide including only their own individual program listings. However, 
companies gave lists of their daily programs for the daily newspapers without any 
charge but with strictly enforced licensing conditions. The license allowed reproduces 
of the information but only for one day program listings information at the time. In 
market of Ireland and North-Ireland were not any weekly TV program magazine which 
would have included weekly program information of these three companies and, in fact, 
these companies demanded copyright protection for the information so that no one 
could publish information without their permission. 
The Irish publisher, Magill, started to publish a weekly magazine of certain TV 
programs broadcasted in Ireland and Northern Ireland. RTE, ITV and BBC wanted to 
deny using their list of programs and obtained injunctions against Magill in a national 
court. The national court supported TV companies’ denial. Magill complained to the 
Commission that the three companies were infringing the Article 102 by refusing to 
give advance listings of their weekly programs and by protecting their listings by 
enforcing their copyright. The Commission considered that the companies were acting 
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against the Article 102. The Commission considered also that all three companies were 
each dominant on the market for their weekly programs listings and that they wanted to 
protect their own individual weekly program guides in the downstream market by 
restricting the information. The CFI upheld the Commission’s decision. RTE and ITP 
appealed.
230
  
Also the ECJ found that there was an infringement of the Article 102; however, its 
judgment was very narrow.
231
 It saw the case as a straightforward refusal to supply 
matter.
232
 The ECJ stated that in exceptional circumstances, a refusal to supply material 
protected by intellectual property rights could be considered as an abuse under the 
Article 102. The ECJ considered that exceptional circumstances in Magill were the 
following: 1) there was no substitute for a weekly TV guide, for which there was a 
specific, constant and regular potential consumer demand; 2) the refusal was preventing 
the entry of new products for which there was consumer demand; 3) there was no 
objective justification for refusal; and 4) the refusal excluded all competition on a 
secondary market by refusing access to the essential raw material.
233
  
The refusal to license an intellectual property is not as such an abuse of dominant 
position because an exclusive right to replicate the work is important part of the 
intellectual property rights.
234
 These four criteria were very important and have been 
developed further after the decision. However, it was not clear if these four criteria were 
cumulative in this case. This question became a major issue.
235
 It left open the question 
whether the new product criterion is essential when finding a refusal to supply abusive 
in intellectual property rights related cases. The reason is that the ECJ found that there 
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would not be a question of a new product if the TV companies had already produced 
that kind of weekly guide, though they would still reserve all a special part on the 
secondary market for themselves. Neither had it been clear whether the barrier of new 
product were necessary or a separate and adequate ground to keep the refusal an 
abuse.
236
 
The main consideration was that the ECJ did not mention the intellectual property rights 
in its discussion of a dominant position and it did not mention essential facilities term in 
its consideration. It referred to Commercial Solvents as an example of established abuse 
of a company on one market preventing the competition on a downstream market.
237
 In 
Magill the ECJ did not give any choices on how the company could avoid committing 
an abuse. The decision established that the norm is that refusal to license is not 
generally an abuse.
238
 It was neither required that the behavior of the companies has 
factually effected significantly to the trade between the Member States. It was enough 
that the behavior might affect this way. The possibility of the effect is shown if 
companies can prevent competitor’s operation on the geographical market.239   
4.3.2 Tiercé Ladbroke case 
Tiercé Ladbroke concerned also a refusal to license intellectual property rights.
 240
 The 
case did not go all the way to the ECJ’s consideration, so there is only the decision of 
the CFI. In Tiercé Ladbroke a Belgian betting company, Tiercé Ladbroke, wanted TV-
broadcasting rights in its betting shops for horse races arranged in France in order to 
exercise betting business in Belgium. The French race course societies (Sociétiés de 
courses) and the associated companies had exclusive duty for organizing off-course 
betting in France, taking bets abroad on French races, taking bets in France in races run 
abroad and exploding  pictures televised outside France (including information about 
the French horse races).   
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The CFI saw the situation differing from Magill. Because sociétiés de courses was not 
in betting shop business in Belgium, the CFI found that there were no downstream 
market as it was the question in Magill. The CFI also considered that it is not necessary 
to show films in connection of betting shop. The copyright owners were not infringing 
the Article 102 as they did not admit license to anyone in the relevant market in 
Belgium. The refusal would have constituted an abuse if the product or service would 
be essential to the betting shop or a new product by consumer demand was prevented to 
entry on the market. The CFI understood here the exceptional circumstances set out in 
Magill as severable, not cumulative. Thus it nominated that the refusal to supply which 
foreclosed the entry of a new product to the market might constitute an abuse for that 
reason alone, even if the access was not essential for the demander.
241
 
4.3.3 IMS Health case 
The IMS Health concerned a system for representing regional pharmaceutical sales data 
in Germany.
242
  This so called 1860 brick structure based on small geographical areas 
(bricks) was based on factors including postcodes, administrative and political 
boundaries and the location of doctors and pharmacies.
243
 IMS Health collected 
pharmaceutical sales information from wholesalers and formatted it in accordance with 
the 1860 brick structure, so that it was possible to analyze the information in several 
ways. IMS Health has been collaborated in the brick structures development which lasts 
several years.
244
 The Commission considered that the brick structure had become an 
industry standard.
245
 IMS Health’s competitors tried to develop the same kind of brick 
structures but IMS Health claimed that these infringed its copyright and obtained 
interim junctions in the national court aiming to prevent their use. 
The competitors complained to the Commission. They claimed that the refusal to 
license prevented them from providing pharmaceutical data services because they could 
not present the data in a way that would be acceptable to the customers without 
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infringing IMS Health‘s copyright. It was also clear that the customers were not willing 
to change to a radically different structure. The customers’ had done changes to their 
IT-systems to correspond the 1860 brick structure. 
The Commission found that the 1860 brick structure was indispensable to operate on the 
relevant market because there was no actual or potential substitute for it. Neither there 
was objective justification for refusal to license. Moreover, there were exceptional 
circumstances in Magill sense. The Commission ordered interim measure by which IMS 
Health was obliged to license on a request and on non-discriminatory bases to third 
parties on the German regional.
246
 
At the same time there was litigation between IMS Health and NDC Health where the 
Landgericht of Frankfurt am Main asked preliminary reference from the ECJ about the 
interpretation of the Article 102 in relation to the refusal to license.  The ECJ set out the 
conditions when the refusal to license copyright would be an abuse of dominant market 
position. According to the ECJ, if the three cumulative conditions were fulfilled the 
abuse was in hand. Firstly, there has to be a new product for which there is a potential 
consumer demand in question. Secondly, the access has to be indispensable, that is, 
without the access all the competition on a secondary market is prevented. And thirdly, 
the refusal is unjustified.
247
 However, the ECJ did not solve if these conditions were 
fulfilled but left this decision to the national court. 
The ECJ however stressed that a refusal to admit a license is not itself an abuse of 
dominant position.
248
 Further, the compulsory license can come into question only in 
exceptional circumstances.
249
 It considered the indispensability condition in Bronner 
sense but demanded that there has to be a question of a new products or services for 
which there is the customer demand. Again, the obligation to license is not to protect the 
competitors but to protect the consumers.  
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The important issues in the case were that firstly, there was a weak copyright in 
question as was in Magill. Secondly, the new product condition was not so clear. The 
Commission found that the products “differ markedly”. The products should not 
“essentially duplicate” the right holder’s product. The ECJ finally stated that only 
situation where the free competition can override the copyright holder is where the 
denial prevents the development of new product on the secondary market to the 
detriment of consumers.
250
 The duty to license is for the consumers’ protection.251 
 From first sight it looks that there was one market. The ECJ held on the requirement of 
“two different stages of production“, it did not require separate upstream and 
downstream markets. The ECJ considered that it was enough that if “potential or even 
hypothetical“ market can be identified as upstream.252  The findings of IMS Health have 
been developed further in Microsoft case which is studied below. 
4.3.4 Microsoft case 
Microsoft case is the latest case concerning the refusal to supply in relation to the 
information technology and it has received a lot of attention. In Microsoft was followed 
the four cumulative criteria set in the earlier cases but the Commission and the CFI 
extended those conditions in their decision. The case concerned interoperability, that is, 
interface information and whether Microsoft was obliged to disclose the interface 
information to its competitors. The interface information is necessary for the software to 
operate in other systems and programs.
253
 The interface information may be protected 
by copyright; however the interface information can be obtainable by reserve 
engineering, but it can be extremely difficult or not practically or economically 
feasible.
254
 In this case the reserve engineering was found impossible or not practically 
or economically feasible. In situation where the software market is dominated by one 
company with a significant market power, it may be necessary for the competition that 
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other suppliers’ software interoperates with the software or the system of the dominant 
company.
255
 
Microsoft case sets out the clear limits for the duty to license situations.
256
 For the first 
time the similar case was under the Commission’s consideration in 1984 where the 
Commission found that IBM abused its dominant position due to its refusal to supply 
the interface information to other suppliers who needed the information to develop 
compatible products to work with IBM’s System/370. The Commission and IBM settled 
the case with the grounds that IBM undertook to disclose the sufficient interface 
information to enable its competitors in the EEC to attach hardware and software 
products of their own design to System/370.
257
  
In Microsoft, Sun demanded that Microsoft should disclose to the suppliers who 
provided server operating systems the adequate interface information to enable them to 
develop workgroup server operating systems that would operate with Microsoft’s 
Windows desktop and server operating systems.
258
 Sun complained that the Microsoft 
held a dominant position on the PC-operating system market (>90% market share).  
Microsoft responded that the interoperability information is protected by intellectual 
property rights and there are other ways to secure interoperability, for example reverse 
engineering. Microsoft also argued that there was competition in workgroup servers’ 
market. The importance of refusal to license was that the competitors could “clone” 
Microsoft’s products if it was obliged to license the information and there would be 
damage to the incentives to innovate from Microsoft’s side.259 
The Commission found that Microsoft had a dominant position both in the PC-operating 
systems market and in the workgroup server operating systems market. Therefore, it 
stated that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by refusing to supply the 
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interface information.
260
 The Commission considered that the criteria set out in Bronner 
and Magill were fulfilled and ordered Microsoft to disclose the relevant interface 
information to the companies on the workgroup server operating systems market and 
keep the information updated and fined Microsoft. However, the Commission 
considered that Microsoft differed from earlier cases because in this case it was the 
question of the distribution of previous levels of supply. The Commission took in its 
consideration an effect-based approach.
261
 The CFI considered that the exceptional 
circumstances set out in Magill and IMS Health were fulfilled and upheld the 
Commission’s decision.   
Both the Commission and the CFI ended up to a detailed analysis of the facts supporting 
a duty to license.  The Commission found the information was indispensable. Firstly, 
interoperability with Windows non-Microsoft work group servers was required in order 
for the competitors to be able remain viably on the market. Secondly, it evaluated 
whether the information was indispensable attaining that. There were no found 
substitutes for disclosure by Microsoft. The Commission considered that the reserve 
engineering was not practically possible because it required “considerable efforts with 
uncertain chances to success”.262  
The Commission found that Microsoft’s refusal to supply eliminated competition. The 
competitors were “at a strong competitive disadvantage…to an extent where there is a 
risk of elimination of competition”.263 The Commission considered that the refusal to 
disclose the information would impact on technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers.
264
 The Commission did not found that the condition of objective 
justification was fulfilled here. It considered that the copyright protection was not an 
objective justification and that disclosure would not have negative impact to Microsoft’s 
incentive to innovation. Rather the disclosure effects positively to whole industry’s 
incentive to innovate..
265
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The Commission extended in Microsoft the new product condition set out in Magill. It 
found that the refusal prevented the technical development. It based its decision to the 
argument that the exceptional circumstances set out in Magill and Bronner were not 
exhaustive and it was possible take into account other circumstances as well. It stated 
that the refusal to supply is made case-by-case basis.
266
 
The CFI confirmed the earlier interpretation of two different markets. In in refusal to 
supply cases there have to be two different markets in question even if the upstream 
market would be almost “hypothetical”.267 The CFI upheld the Commission’s decision 
of indispensability condition and considered in here indispensability did not mean the 
exclusion from the market.
268
 The CFI interpreted that with the elimination of 
competition criterion was meant elimination of effective competition on the 
downstream market.
269
 Secondly, it found that it is not necessary to wait that the 
competition actually eliminates competition but it was enough that there is a risk of 
elimination of effective competition.
270
 This decision differed from Magill where it was 
found that the potential entrant was entirely excluded from the market.
271
 
The CFI confirmed the Commission’s finding of new product that it was enough that 
the refusal to license limited technical development to the prejudice of consumers (the 
Article 102 (b)). It found that appearance of a new product was not the only relevant 
parameter and that the Article applied to the limitation of technical development and 
production and markets.
272
 The CFI rejected Microsoft’s argument that the disclosure of 
the interoperability information would allow cloning the Microsoft’s products. The 
competitors had all reasons to develop new differentiated products.
273
 The disclosure of 
the interoperability information did not enable competitors to avoid the need for 
innovation. Neither the CFI found objective justification for refusal to disclose. The 
intellectual property right was not a sufficient justification in here. 
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4.4 Key considerations for duty to license analysis in relation to intellectual 
property rights 
In case law have been developed the four cumulative criteria which have to be fulfilled 
before the duty to license can come into question. These conditions are 1) the 
indispensability, 2) the elimination of competition, 4) the new product entry, and 4) the 
objective justification. Considering of the indispensability and the elimination of 
competition conditions under the case law, especially under Microsoft, can be ended up 
to the conclusion that the intellectual property rights are essential for a long-run 
innovation competition, not only for the short run price competition.
274
  
The duty to license analysis under Article 102 is based on a consideration of dynamic 
competition, not on static competition. The exclusion of price competition is inherent 
for intellectual property rights; therefore the mere static price concerns are not sufficient 
to justify duty to license. Rather the short term exclusion of the price competition 
incentives for long run competition through new innovations.
275
 Further, the duty to 
license should be limited only to the serious market failure cases.
276
  
The intellectual property embodies the key competitive features of products; therefore 
the following questions requires a careful analysis when duty to license is treated: 1) the 
nature of intellectual property and its value for the company which holds the dominant 
position; 2) the manner in which the dominant company exploits its intellectual 
property; and 3) the purpose for which the requesting company wishes to use the 
intellectual property.
277
 
The duty to license intellectual property should stimulate innovation, but the risk in the 
duty to license is that it simply allows competitors to avoid innovation. It should be 
always analyzed that the duty to license really brings some new technology to the 
market, that is, the purpose of the duty to license is not to produce only minor 
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improvements or features of some product or software. New variant is not justification 
for duty to license.
278
  
On the other hand it could be asked whether the intellectual property is an essential 
competitive element of the company or just an additional feature. The impact to the 
dominant company’s operation perhaps is not so significant if it is question of the 
additional feature compared if it is question of the core business of the dominant 
company.
279
 
The Microsoft is an important precedent of applying the duty to license test. It set forth 
important limitations on intellectual property rights when those are in conflict with the 
European competition law.
280
 However, it cannot be applied as a precedent for every 
company in every industry, the fact is that Microsoft is a super dominant and can create 
de facto standards. Each case has to be considered against the specific circumstances of 
each case. At the end the competition must always be assessed based on how successful 
it is among the consumers. In particularly in the IT-sector the consumers’ choice and 
innovation are the key factors of success.
281
   
 
5 CONCLUSION 
This thesis sets out the question whether a company in the dominant market position 
has an obligation to license software, and if so, on which grounds that obligation is 
justified. According to the case law the answer is yes and especially when a certain 
criteria have been met. If a company holds a dominant position and its software is 
indispensable for the competitors to be able to operate on the neighboring market, there 
is no substitute for the software and it is practically impossible for the competitor to 
create a substitute alone or together with the other competitors; the refusal to license 
eliminates the competition or there is a risk of elimination of competition on the 
neighboring market; the refusal to license prevents entry of a new product or limits 
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technology developments for which there is a potential consumer demand; and there is 
no objective justification for the refusal, the essential facility doctrine applies and the 
company may have the duty to license its software.  
Applying the essential facility doctrine is not simple as it has to be applied case by case 
taking into account the special circumstances of each case. Additionally there exist risks 
when applying the duty to license. Firstly, the relevant markets can be defined too 
narrow when it is more obvious that the company is considered to be in a dominant 
position. Secondly, the consideration of the new product criteria should be applied with 
sufficient carefulness and not to be extended too much. The criteria were already 
extended to cover also the limitation of technical developments in Microsoft which has 
broadened the field of application to extreme limits.  
In every business the goals are to develop a product or a service that would become a 
breakthrough, succeed and gain revenue. The companies compare themselves to each 
other and compete in having the biggest market share. This is also the driver behind the 
software business. This kind of business, however, requires risk management. Then the 
question is how much the companies should pay attention to the risk of duty to license 
when they are developing their products. In other words, how much risk management 
should be used beforehand in situations where the company should rely on the 
protection of the general law?   
The subject arises a question whether it could be possible to oblige also a non-dominant 
company to license its software. Could a non-dominant company’s software be so 
essential? If the answer is yes to both of these questions, how it would be justified 
compared to a dominant company’s conditions to license? Even though the essential 
facility doctrine has strict conditions and it should be carefully applied, there is still a 
risk that the four aforementioned criteria are extended from the present legal practice. If 
the duty to license is extended too much it would be a serious threat to the development. 
In practice the software is mostly licensed by agreements when the companies can 
manage their risks and negotiate the terms of agreements. Supervising a dominant 
position is based on afterward evaluation which, though, may have major consequences 
65 
 
for the companies, as was seen in the Microsoft case.
 282
 This may mean that the 
companies need to put more resources to the risk management. If duty to license really 
becomes a risk, the companies should add to their risk management the possibility of 
duty to license. Is the purpose of the regulation to increase legal resource costs needed 
in the risk management and does it slow down the companies’ development at the 
expense of the consumers? From a practical point of view, these are the relevant 
questions that perhaps are not taken into account when applying the Article 102 and the 
essential facility doctrine. 
There have been discussions whether the copyright is the best protection form for 
software rather than being protected by trade secrets, or whether the software should be 
protected at all. Despite the unprotecting in this area, the competition could lead to 
innovations in the software industry. The critics see the open-source software 
movement created voluntarily by the relinquished software industry’s intellectual 
monopoly as the best evidence of that.
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  By this way, the competition law problems 
between the intellectual property rights and competition law might not be as 
complicated. By this way it might be possible to even avoid intellectual monopolies. 
The other question is, though, would this really incentive innovations and benefit 
consumers. It is very interesting issue and raises many interesting questions relating 
antithesis of copyright and unprotection. However, the issue has not been discussed in 
this thesis and actually it could be a subject for another thesis. 
It is impossible to cover all the questions arising around this thesis when the essential 
facility doctrine as a subject is very broad. Thus some of the questions have been 
covered just within certain limits. One of the most important questions limited outside 
this thesis is; on what terms the access to the facility must be given? The future shows 
whether the essential facility doctrine criteria extend to cover new possible facilities and 
whether the criteria will be developed further due to new facilities with own features. In 
the software business the cloud computing and SaaS (Software as a Service) have 
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become more popular along with the traditional software. It would be interesting to 
know how the essential facility doctrine would fit to these services. 
 
 
 
 
